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 Abstract 
Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular those relating to 
takeovers, board structure and directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards 
a norm of shareholder primacy.  Beyond the core, in particular at the 
intersection of insolvency and employment law, stakeholder interests are better 
represented, thanks to European Community influence.  Moreover, institutional 
shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies away from a focus on 
short-term returns, in such a way as to favour stakeholder-inclusive practices.  
We therefore suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that 
the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely believed that the United Kingdom’s system of corporate 
governance, in common with that of the United States but in contrast to those of 
mainland Europe and Japan, places the interests of shareholders above those of 
other corporate stakeholders, such as employees and creditors.  We examine this 
claim through a close study of corporate governance institutions in the UK.  Our 
focus is on the rules and practices governing restructuring in large corporations 
with external shareholders, an area where potential inter-stakeholder conflicts 
are particularly intense.  We suggest that certain core institutions – takeover 
regulations, corporate governance codes, and the law relating to directors’ 
fiduciary duties – are indeed highly shareholder orientated (section 2).  
However, in other areas, particularly in the interplay between insolvency law 
and statutory employee representation, there is considerable scope for the 
exercise of voice by non-shareholder constituencies (section 3).  In addition, 
institutional shareholders are beginning to play a more active role in promoting 
stakeholder-inclusive practices by the companies in which they invest (section 
4).  On this basis we conclude that the system, rather than stabilizing around a 
norm of shareholder primacy, is currently in a state of flux.   
 
Our analysis is designed to cast light on the active debate which has taken place 
in the UK over the past decade about the merits of a stakeholder-based approach 
to corporate governance.  Notwithstanding the claims made by adherents of this 
approach (Hutton, 1995; Kay and Silberston, 1995), calls for a more explicit 
recognition of the role of non-shareholder constituencies have not so far led to 
significant legal or institutional change.  The Company Law Review, while 
making some concessions to stakeholder concerns in the form of new reporting 
requirements for companies, rejected calls for changes to the law governing 
directors’ duties (Company Law Review Steering Group, 2001, 2002; see 
Williamson, 2002).  The reaction to the corporate scandals of 2001-2 was 
telling.  In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, rushed into place by 
Congress in the summer of 2002 largely as a response to the Enron affair, 
completely ignored stakeholder claims in favour of further entrenching 
accountability to shareholders (Deakin and Konzelmann, 2003).  In the UK, the 
Higgs review of the role of non-executive directors (Higgs, 2003), while milder 
than Sarbanes-Oxley in terms of the requirements that it would impose upon 
companies, shared its philosophy of shareholder primacy.  Meanwhile there are 
signs that the shareholder value norm is exerting a growing influence on other 
systems, in particular Germany (Lane, 2003).  It is therefore not surprising that 
leading corporate governance scholars should have argued that the fundamental 
issues of corporate ownership and control have now been settled in favour of 
the shareholder value model (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). 
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On the basis of the analysis of institutions that we present below, we reject this 
claim as far as the UK is concerned.  Corporate governance in the UK has not 
reached the ‘end of history’.  The shareholder value model is less deeply rooted 
than is generally supposed.  The institutions which support it – above all, the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the corporate governance codes – are 
of recent origin.  From an historical perspective, the extent of shareholder pre-
eminence achieved in the 1980s and 1990s, far from being a normal state of 
affairs, is an anomaly (Davies, 2002).  Today, the exclusion of stakeholder 
voice from corporate decision making is far from uncontested.  But just as there 
is no straightforward way back to a time before the rise of the hostile takeover 
bid and the assertion of institutional investor power, so there is little prospect of 
the UK model converging on mainland European or Japanese practices, not 
least because these are undergoing changes of their own.   What we are likely to 
see instead is a period of uncertainty as the corporate governance actors struggle 
to come to terms with the inevitable contradictions and tensions of the 
shareholder primacy norm.    
  
 
2. The core institutions of UK corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance systems around the world have been categorised in a 
range of different ways. Perhaps the most helpful of these distinguishes between 
outsider/arm’s length, and insider/control-oriented, systems (Berglöf, 1997; 
Cheffins, 2002). The ‘insider/outsider’ distinction refers to the degree of 
concentration of share ownership, and the arm’s length/control-oriented 
dichotomy relates to the degree of activity exhibited by shareholders in matters 
related to corporate governance. Dispersed ownership is associated with 
shareholder passivity because, where each shareholder has only a small amount 
at stake, they have little incentive to intervene in the running of the firm. In 
contrast, concentrated share ownership is associated with shareholder activity, 
as the owners of large blocks of shares will reap much of the benefit of their 
interventions.  Dispersed share ownership is the norm in the UK, where over 
85% of listed firms lack a shareholder with 25% or more of voting rights 
(Crespi-Cladera and Renneboog, 2000: 4). This is similar to the US, but 
contrasts dramatically with the position in other developed countries, which 
have insider/control-oriented systems (Gospel and Pendleton, 2003).  
 
Fashions in corporate governance (in the sense of both practice and scholarship) 
have changed over the years. However, the currently dominant paradigm in 
outsider/arm’s length systems is for corporate governance mechanisms to be 
understood as a set of responses to the separation of ownership and control, that 
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is, the familiar agency problem arising from the opportunities provided to 
managers to further their own personal goals at the expense of the shareholders 
(see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This view, which is variously characterised as 
the shareholder value or shareholder primacy approach, accepts that in a system 
of dispersed ownership, shareholder passivity is inevitable and perhaps even 
desirable (in the sense that it is not necessarily in the best interests of the firm 
for ownership to be concentrated in the hands of a dominant group of investors 
who can then extract private benefits of control).  As a result, mechanisms other 
than those based on direct intervention are required in order to keep managers’ 
actions aligned with the interests of shareholders. Much energy has been 
devoted in the past twenty years to facilitating governance mechanisms of this 
type. These include the law relating to directors’ duties, supervision via non-
executive directors, executive compensation agreements, managerial labour 
markets that respond to past performance, the market for corporate control, 
discipline exercised by creditors, and competitive product markets.  
 
What is striking about the UK framework is just how focused on the 
shareholder value model it appears to be. This can be seen through an 
examination of several core governance mechanisms: hostile takeovers, 
directors’ duties, and board structure.  But it is also the case that shareholder 
primacy has not gone unchallenged, and that the internal contradictions of the 
shareholder value approach are increasingly reflected in the current policy 
debate. 
2.1 Hostile takeovers 
 
Within the framework of the shareholder value model, the hostile takeover is a 
key mechanism for aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders.  
The extent to which the hostile takeover can work as a disciplinary device in 
this way is largely a function of the legal and regulatory regime. In particular, 
the extent to which incumbents may employ defensive tactics, such as the use of 
‘poison pills’ – pre-commitments to engage in some activity or restructuring if a 
hostile bid succeeds that will destroy any value the bidder would obtain from 
the firm – will affect the level of hostile bid activity. The regime in the UK is 
highly restrictive of the use of defensive tactics (Deakin and Slinger, 1997). 
Takeovers of public companies are regulated by the City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers (Takeover Panel, 2002). This is a self-regulatory framework dating 
from the late 1960s, adherence to which is overseen by the Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers, a group of specialists drawn from practice and from regulatory 
organisations in the City of London. Although the Code does not itself have the 
force of law, it may be enforced by regulatory bodies exercising statutory 
powers, including by the Financial Services Authority (see FSA, 2001).  
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General Principle 7 and Rule 21 of the City Code proscribe managerial actions 
which might frustrate a bid. General Principle 7 states: 
  
At no time after a bona fide offer has been communicated to the 
board of the offeree company, or after the board of the offeree 
company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be 
imminent, may any action be taken by the board of the offeree 
company in relation to the affairs of the company, without the 
approval of the shareholders in general meeting, which could 
effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the 
shareholders being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits. 
 
Rule 21, which fleshes out General Principle 7, provides that from the point in 
time at which the incumbents believe that an offer might be imminent, the board 
of directors may not issue shares, options, or convertible securities, agree to sell, 
dispose of or acquire assets of a material amount, or to enter into any contract 
otherwise than in the ordinary course of business. Together, these rule out 
defensive tactics by the incumbents once a bid is on the horizon, otherwise than 
in accordance with the wishes of shareholders.  
 
The Code does not apply to actions taken when there is no threat of a bid. It 
might be thought therefore that a board could unobtrusively commit the 
company to a poison pill, so as to protect it from any bid which might 
subsequently materialise. It is clear that in at least a small minority of cases, 
pre-bid defensive tactics such as poison pills are employed (Paul, 1991: 142).  
However, the structure of shareholder rights means that a board is hard pressed 
to commit the company to something sufficiently ‘poisonous’ to deter a bidder, 
without the prior approval of the shareholders. In particular, issues of new 
shares, repurchases of existing shares, and significant transactions with related 
parties all require the consent of a majority of shareholders. Moreover, directors 
who attempt to create a ‘poison pill’ may be found to have breached their 
fiduciary duties by exercising their powers for an improper purpose, namely the 
protection of their own position, as opposed to the furtherance of the company’s 
business.   
 
Senior managers are likely to be replaced following a UK takeover regardless of 
whether or how the firm is under-performing. This leads Franks and Mayer 
(1996) to conclude that takeovers represent a poorly focused disciplinary 
mechanism. Studies of the accounting performance of the targets of successful 
UK hostile takeovers have shown, on average, small—but statistically 
significant—improvements after the bid (Franks and Mayer, 1996; Cosh and 
Guest, 2001), although these were not inversely related to pre-bid 
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underperformance. Again, this tends to contradict the idea that managers are 
being disciplined. However, the evidence is consistent with the idea that 
management teams face takeovers if their future strategy is not as good as it 
might be: what Stapledon (1996) refers to as ‘ex ante discipline’.  
 
Firms may be acquired for reasons other than underperformance by managers 
(see Romano, 1992 and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, for a full discussion). Other 
common objectives include the realisation of synergy gains, the pursuit of 
monopolistic practices, empire-building by bidder management, and most 
importantly for current purposes, the expropriation of employees and other non-
shareholders constituencies. When such expropriation occurs, a bidder may pay 
a premium for a company’s shares not because of managerial 
underperformance, but because, through breaching implicit contracts with 
employees, quasi-rents which were being paid to this group can instead be 
diverted to shareholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Thus a focus on 
takeover bids highlights one of the fundamental tensions of the shareholder 
value model: the more the hostile takeover is facilitated as a disciplinary device, 
the more difficult it may become for firms to make credible commitments to 
their employees that implicit contracts to share quasi-rents will not be breached. 
In turn, this will make employees less willing to make firm-specific investments 
ex ante, and can result in loss of value for all participants.  
 
The normative case for regulatory facilitation of takeover bids therefore 
depends on the extent to which they have value-enhancing, as opposed to 
merely redistributive, effects.  This is a question for empirical research, but 
measuring the welfare effects of takeovers on all stakeholders, as opposed to the 
impact on shareholders’ interests as expressed through stock price movements 
or corporate profitability, is extremely difficult.  Conyon et al. (2002) found 
evidence that hostile takeovers in the UK between 1987 and 1996 were associated 
with significant falls in both employment and output for the firms concerned, and 
concluded that the overall effect of such mergers was, after controlling for the 
change in output, to enhance the efficiency with which labour was utilized at firm 
level.  On this basis the authors claimed that ‘the results are generally supportive 
of the view that merger activity, particularly related and hostile merger activity, 
promotes efficiency’.  However, they also accepted that ‘if the observed 
employment reductions constitute a reneging on the implicit terms of the labour 
contract, in the sense of Shleifer and Summers (1988), there may be associated 
costs generated through the subsequent reductions in firm-specific human capital 
investment by employees.  These will be manifested in lower output levels but any 
such changes would be very hard to identify’ (Conyon et al., 2002: 40).   
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Deakin et al. (2003) conducted case studies of some of the most prominent of 
the takeover bids of the mid-1990s’ wave in the UK, including the contests 
which involved Glaxo and Wellcome, Granada and Forte, and the restructuring 
of the electricity industry following its privatization.  On the basis of interviews 
with bid participants including directors, investment bankers, legal advisers and 
employee representatives, they found that the regime of the City Code was 
perceived as having a considerable impact on both the conduct and outcome of 
bids.  During bids, directors of bid targets reported that they focused on the 
concerns of target shareholders to the exclusion of other stakeholder groups.  A 
review of the case studies five years on from the initial interviews found that, 
almost without exception, mergers had led to large-scale job losses and asset 
disposals.  However, analysis of the discussion of these mergers in the financial 
press over the period in question showed that after an initially favourable response 
from the City, almost none of the mergers (including those initiated by Glaxo and 
Granada respectively) were considered by the financial community, at the end of 
the period, to have generated a surplus for shareholders.   
 
The evidence on the overall welfare effects of hostile takeovers is unclear.  
What can be said with some confidence is that the City Code sets up a regime 
that focuses director attention in the conduct of a bid on the immediate question 
of whether it is in the shareholders’ best interests to accept a tender offer.  In 
principle, this could impose a constraint on the capacity of UK managers to 
engage in a strategy of building long-term relations with stakeholders.  The 
existence of this possible constraint was noted by the Company Law Review 
(Company Law Review Steering Committee, 2000: paras. 3.162-3.168; 
Company Law Review Steering Committee, 2001: paras. 6.19-6.21).  While the 
Steering Committee concluded that ‘there was no clear case made out for 
inhibiting the takeover market’ (Company Law Review Steering Committee, 
2001: 140), it nevertheless proposed to the UK Listing Authority that the 
Listing Rules be strengthened so that a wider range of transactions would be 
referred to shareholders in the bidder company for their prior approval, and that 
parties to takeovers should issue stakeholder-related information at the time an 
offer is made (Company Law Review Steering Committee, 2001: 140-141).  
Thus the argument that, as the Steering Committee put it, ‘synergies [from 
takeovers] were often exaggerated and… employment and productive capacity 
were often destroyed by such deals, without economic benefit’ (Company Law 
Review Steering Committee, 2001: 140), did not fall on completely deaf ears. 
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2.2 Directors’ duties and responsibilities to stakeholders 
 
While the Takeover Code strongly prioritises shareholder interests,  general 
company law observes the legal principle that directors must act in good faith in 
the interests of the company, rather than those of the shareholders alone (see 
Parkinson, 2003).  How much leeway this gives boards is a matter of dispute.  
Boards are permitted to take a view based on what the Company Law Review 
Steering Group (1999: 37) called ‘enlightened shareholder value’, that is, 
striking a balance between the competing interests of the different stakeholders 
in order to benefit the shareholders in the long run (Company Law Review 
Steering Group, 1999: 37).  From this vantage point, it should, for example, be 
legally open to the directors to pursue a policy of minimum redundancies (to 
gain the cooperation of the workforce) or a preferred supplier policy (to enhance 
the quality of supplier relations), if the ultimate objective of these policies is to 
advance shareholders’ interests.  Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 
apparently goes further, imposing upon boards a duty to consider the interests of 
employees alongside those of shareholders when exercising their duty to act in 
the interests of the company.  However, employee representatives do not have 
standing to enforce this duty, and unsurprisingly it has rarely been invoked in 
the courts.  Moreover, during a takeover bid, neither section 309 nor the general 
law of fiduciary obligation has been interpreted as standing in the way of the 
principle of board neutrality, nor as diluting the specific obligations which 
boards have under the Takeover Code to ensure that objective financial advice 
is provided to shareholders on the merits to the bid, although there is clear 
potential for conflict between general company law and the Code’s strong 
endorsement of shareholder primacy (Deakin and Slinger, 1997; Davies, 2002). 
 
During its deliberations, the Company Law Review Steering Group considered 
two versions of what it called the ‘scope’ issue.  The first was ‘enlightened 
shareholder value’, as just defined.  The second was a ‘pluralist’ position 
according to which ‘company law should be modified to include other 
objectives so that a company is required to serve a wider range of interests, not 
subordinate to, or as a means of achieving, shareholder value (as envisioned in 
the enlightened shareholder value view), but as valid in their own right’ 
(Company Law Review Steering Group, 1999: 37).  In the end, the Steering 
Group rejected calls for directors’ duties to be modified in this way.  Instead, it 
came down in favour of a restatement of duties in which there would be ‘[a]n 
obligation on directors to achieve the success of the company for the benefit of 
the shareholders by taking proper account of all the relevant considerations for 
that purpose’ including ‘a proper balanced view of the short and long term, the 
need to sustain effective ongoing relationships with employees, customers, 
suppliers and others; and the need to maintain the company’s reputation and to 
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consider the impact of its operations on the community and the environment’ 
(Company Law Review Steering Group, 2000: 13; see also Company Law 
Review Steering Group, 2001: 41).  The Steering Group nevertheless coupled 
this with a proposal for a new statutory requirement for listed companies (and 
certain other ‘very large companies with real economic power’) to publish an 
operating and financial review (‘OFR’) as part of the annual report.  This would 
‘cover all that is material in the directors’ view for users to achieve a proper 
assessment of the performance and future plans and prospects of the business’ 
including ‘where relevant its relationships with employees and others and its 
impact on the community and environment’ (Company Law Review Steering 
Group, 2000: 13).  The OFR is based on an existing, non-statutory model for 
company reporting which is recommended by the UK Accounting Standards 
Board and is already in widespread use by listed companies. 
 
The Steering Group’s assessment of its own proposal was that it came down 
somewhere in between the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist points of 
view.  The proposal’s objective, it argued, was pluralist, in the sense that 
‘companies should be run in such a way which maximizes overall 
competitiveness and wealth and welfare for all’ (Company Law Review 
Steering Group, 2000: 14).  The means chosen to achieve this end were the 
‘inclusive duty’ and ‘broader accountability’ (Company Law Review Steering 
Group, 2000: 15). The idea that acting genuinely in the best interests of 
shareholders, in modern companies, required directors to take into account a 
wider range of constituencies, was to be made transparent through a reporting 
framework that clearly recognised the importance to corporate success of 
‘qualitative and intangible, or “soft” assets such as the skills and knowledge of 
their employees and their corporate reputation’ (Company Law Review Steering 
Group, 2000: 15). 
 
But since no change to the substance of directors’ fiduciary duties was 
proposed, this was in essence an endorsement of enlightened shareholder value.  
Moreover, even this endorsement was limited, since no proposal was made to 
amend the Takeover Code in such a way as to deal with its more narrow focus 
on the protection of shareholders’ short-term financial interests during a 
takeover bid.  Thus the question inevitably arises of whether the Steering Group 
willed the end without providing the necessary institutional means to achieve it.  
At the same time, the proposal for the extended OFR demonstrates that 
concerns over the negative implications for competitiveness of an excessive 
focus on shareholder returns were not ignored. 
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2.3 Board structure and accountability under the Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance  
 
Running alongside efforts to reform company law through the Company Law 
Review there has been a continuing debate over the use of soft law mechanisms 
to promote transparency and accountability in listed companies. In particular, 
the corporate governance landscape in the UK has since the early 1990s been 
transformed by a series of quasi-voluntary codes which have specified a range 
of governance mechanisms ostensibly designed to increase the accountability of 
senior managers to shareholders. They originated with the Report of Cadbury 
Committee (1992), followed by that of the Greenbury Committee (1995) on 
Executive Remuneration, and the Hampel Committee (1997), following which 
the Combined Code was produced. While the Code is ostensibly voluntary, the 
UK Listing Rules require companies, as part of their annual report, to disclose 
how they have complied with the Code or, if they have not done so, to give 
reasons for this departure (rule 12.43A), hence the approach which has come to 
be known as ‘comply or explain’. 
 
The principal aspects of the Code (UK Listing Authority, 2002) emphasise the 
importance of non-executive directors as a mechanism of supervision of 
executives, with non-executives making up at least a third of the board and 
possessing sufficient experience, expertise and independence for their views to 
carry significant weight in the board’s decisions (Principle A.3); the separation 
of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board (Principle A.2); automatic 
re-election of directors at least every three years (Principle A.6); the use of 
board sub-committees for nomination (Principle A4), remuneration (Principles 
B.2, B.4) and audit (principle D3), with a major role in each case for 
non-executive and independent directors; and the disclosure to shareholders of 
policy concerning remuneration (a ‘significant element’ of which should be 
performance-related) and of service contracts (for which there is a ‘strong case’ 
for a maximum duration of one year) (Principle B.1). In this way, the Combined 
Code has established itself as a focal set of issues around which the governance 
practices of companies are measured. Empirical research suggests that the 
structure of the boards of public companies and the way in which they operate 
have changed in response to the dissemination of the Code (see, for example, 
Pye, 2000).  Compliance levels with the Combined Code are now high. For 
example, PIRC (1999) found that 87% of their sample of listed UK companies 
had separated the roles of Chairman and CEO, and 93% had non-executives 
comprising more than one-third of the board. 
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However, while levels of compliance are striking, the extent to which these 
measures have actually improved corporate performance is questionable. A 
recent study by Weir et al. (2001) investigated the relationship between a 
number of the governance measures outlined in the Combined Code and 
corporate financial performance, measured using annual corporate accounts. 
Specifically, they considered whether (i) the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board, (ii) the independence of non-executive directors; (iii) the 
independence of audit committees; and (iv) the separation of the roles of 
Chairman and CEO, was significantly related to financial performance. None 
was. The authors concluded that ‘the link between internal governance 
mechanisms and performance is, at best, weak’ (Weir et al., 2001: 27). This 
finding is not alone, but echoes those of Faccio and Lasfer (1999) and Buckland 
(2001), who also failed to find anything other than very weak relationships 
between the proportion of non-executive directors, and whether or not 
CEO/Chairman roles were combined, and firm performance. Rates of UK CEO 
forced turnover do not appear to have increased during the 1990s, suggesting 
that the greater preponderance of non-executive directors has done little to 
hasten the removal of underperforming executives (see Conyon and Florou, 
2002).  US studies also question whether there is a link between board structure 
and firm performance (Bhagat and Black, 1998).  Pye (2000), in an interview 
study, provides qualitative evidence as to why this might be the case for the UK, 
noting that directors felt that non-executives were still selected and evaluated by 
unspoken rules. Furthermore, it was felt that the Combined Code approach had 
led to a culture of box-ticking  with which it was straightforward for companies 
to comply, without necessarily engendering good performance. 
 
But despite signs that compliance with the Code has been largely formal, with 
little impact as yet at the organizational level of companies, the approach 
initiated by Cadbury has been confirmed in the most recent corporate 
governance review, namely the examination by Derek Higgs of the role of non-
executive directors in listed companies.  His report, published under the 
sponsorship of the Department of Trade and Industry in February 2003 (Higgs, 
2003), was intended as the UK response to the issues raised by Enron and other 
US corporate scandals.  Higgs recommended a strengthening of non-executive 
representation and independence on boards, stricter rules on the separation of 
the Chair and CEO roles, and a new position of ‘senior independent director’ set 
up to facilitate liaison between the board and shareholders.  By retaining  the 
comply-or-explain approach to regulation, Higgs’ proposals were aimed at 
avoiding the more rigid and punitive aspects of the US regulatory response to 
Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. However, the thinking underpinning 
the Higgs recommendations, allowing for differences between the UK and US 
regulatory frameworks, was essentially the same as for Sarbanes-Oxley: both 
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aimed to tighten further the mechanisms of accountability running from senior 
managers through the board to shareholders.   
 
The corporate governance codes were developed against an assumption that, as 
Higgs put it, ‘[e]nsuring the highest standards of boardroom governance can 
only assist in closing the productivity gap that exists with our major 
competitors’ (Higgs, 2003: 11).  Thus the issue of competitiveness which was at 
the heart of the Company Law Review was by no means absent from the 
deliberations surrounding the making of the codes.  But whereas the Company 
Law Review at least addressed the potentially negative implications of 
shareholder primacy for productive capacity, the various committees 
responsible for drawing up the codes have barely touched on this issue.  This 
disjuncture is significant, since the code-making process has been much more 
productive than the Review, so far at least, in terms of the output of new rules 
and standards.  Thus while the core institutions of corporate governance have 
been increasingly influenced by the shareholder-orientated agenda of the codes, 
they have been left largely untouched by the pressure for change initiated by the 
stakeholder debate.  When, however, we look beyond the core, we quickly see 
that this pressure has been manifested in other ways. 
 
 
3.  Corporate governance beyond the core 
 
A narrow focus on core institutions would suggest that UK corporate 
governance practice is heavily weighted towards shareholder interests.  The 
interplay of ownership and control rights in larger companies is not, however, 
exhausted by a consideration of the rules governing shareholder rights and 
board structure.  In the process of corporate restructuring, insolvency law and 
employment law often play a pivotal role.  We consider, firstly, the functional 
role of employment and creditor representation in corporate governance, and 
then use a case study, the sale of Rover to Phoenix in 2000, to show how 
employment and insolvency law interact in practice. 
 
3.1 The interplay between employee consultation and corporate insolvency 
law 
 
In common with other developed countries, the UK has seen a considerable 
decline in trade union membership and in the coverage of collective bargaining 
since the late 1970s, a trend which has yet to be clearly reversed by the 
enactment of statutory recognition procedures in the Employment Relations Act 
1999 (Oxenbridge et al., 2003).  Alongside the collective bargaining system, 
however, employment law increasingly imposes obligations upon employers to 
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enter into processes of information and consultation with employee 
representatives.  European Community legislation in the form of the Acquired 
Rights Directive (‘ARD’)1 and the Collective Redundancies Directive (‘CRD’)2 
is particularly important in respect of the corporate restructuring process.  If a 
business is transferred from one employer to another as part of a restructuring, 
or in the event of large-scale redundancies, representatives of the employees 
affected have the right to be informed and consulted by the relevant employer.  
Under UK law, applying the terms of the ARD and CRD as interpreted by the 
European Court of Justice3, where an independent trade union is recognised by 
the employer for the purposes of collective bargaining over the terms and 
conditions of relevant employees, the employer must enter into consultation 
over redundancies or a business transfer with that union.4 But equally, even 
where there is no recognised trade union, the employer must consult employee 
representatives who are elected or selected under procedures laid down by 
legislation.5    Additional obligations of information and consultation arise if the 
employer is subject to the requirement to establish a European Works Council 
(EWC).6  Under Article 12 of the EWC Directive, in the absence of a voluntary 
agreement between the relevant parties, the employer is required to consult once 
a year on a range of matters which include ‘the structure, economic and 
financial situation, the probable development of the business and of production 
and sales, the situation and probable trend of employment, investments and 
substantial changes concerning organization, introduction of new working 
methods or production processes, transfers of production, mergers, cut-backs or 
closures of undertakings, establishments or important parts thereof, and 
collective redundancies’. 
 
The ARD, in particular, also supplies individual employees with important job 
security rights.  In the event of a transfer of employment, the rights and 
obligations of the transferor employer are automatically carried over to the 
transferee.  In other words, the transferor’s employment law obligations run 
with the assets and goodwill which are the subject of the transfer.  Dismissal in 
connection with a transfer is automatically unfair, and, in addition, a claim for 
compensation arises in the event of the employer’s failure to consult with the 
relevant employee representatives. 7 
 
Significantly, the ARD does not apply to takeovers or mergers which are 
effected through a share transfer.  The issue of employee consultation rights 
during a takeover bid has proved highly controversial in the context both of the 
City Code on Mergers and Takeovers and the proposed Thirteenth Directive on 
takeover bids.  Employees and employee representatives have no standing 
before the City Panel which administers the Code.  The announcement of a 
takeover bid does not, in itself, trigger obligations to consult under the CRD; 
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this will only occur once redundancies are in contemplation which will not 
normally be until after the bid process has been completed.  Rule 24.1.d of the 
Takeover Code provides that the bidder company must state its objectives with 
regard to the continued employment of employees in the merged company at the 
time it makes its tender offer.  However, this is normally satisfied by a 
‘boilerplate’ reference, in the offer document issued to shareholders, to the 
effect that the bidder will respect the existing legal rights of the employees.  
This provides them with no greater right to be consulted during the takeover bid 
over the effects of likely restructuring than they would otherwise have, and 
interview studies show that  rule 24.1.d is thought by corporate governance 
practitioners to have little significance (see Deakin et al. 2003). 
 
Outside the context of the takeover bid, however, the consultation provisions of 
European Community law can have a substantial impact on the restructuring 
process (Armour and Deakin, 2003).  Their effect arises from the way they 
interact with insolvency law and procedure.  UK insolvency law partitions 
residual control rights between debtor and creditor on a sequential and 
contingent basis. If default occurs, creditors become, in effect, the firm’s 
residual claimants, excluding shareholders (Hart and Moore, 1997).  At the 
same time, the enforcement of creditors’ rights generates considerable decision-
making costs. Lenders may engage in a wasteful ‘race to collect’, dismembering 
the firm’s business and leading to loss of value where it is worth more as a 
going concern. Corporate insolvency law solves this problem by collectivising 
creditors’ governance rights at precisely the moment when the costs of 
exercising them individually are highest (Jackson, 1982). Individual property 
rights in the firm’s assets are thereby redefined as collective property rights to 
be dealt with by the creditors as a group.  For this reason, insolvency law 
imposes a formal stay of claims.8 Alternatively, security interests can be viewed 
as effecting a transformation of individual property rights into a unified asset 
pool (Picker, 1992).  The English law administrative receivership procedure, 
although formally an enforcement mechanism employed by a single secured 
creditor, operates in this way (Armour and Frisby, 2001).9 
 
The ARD and CRD play a similar, functional role to the rules of insolvency law 
in protecting stakeholder voice (see Armour and Deakin, 2003).  Employees’ 
collective information and consultation rights, like those of the creditors in 
relation to insolvency, lie dormant until the point when they are activated by the 
employer’s decision to engage on a restructuring.  It is principally those events 
which put at risk employees’ firm-specific human capital or their entitlements to 
share in quasi-rents – large scale redundancies, the sale of the employer’s 
business to a third party, the outsourcing of parts of the employer’s operation – 
which trigger the obligation to consult.  At this point, the mechanisms of 
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employment law operate in the same way as those of insolvency law:  
divergences of interest between different employees can be resolved, to some 
degree at least, through the employee representatives who are granted what are, 
in effect, monopoly representation rights in relation to information and 
consultation laws.   
 
3.2  Stakeholder voice in action: the Rover case 
 
The sale of Rover to Phoenix in 2001 illustrates how laws that grant employees 
voice rights may have an effect on the way in which corporate transactions are 
structured.  In the autumn of 1999, Rover’s overseas parent company (BMW) 
decided to sell it on the grounds that it was running losses of over £2 million per 
day.  If no buyer were found, BMW had plans to liquidate Rover’s business on 
the basis of a members’ voluntary winding-up, making it possible to realise the 
company’s assets and (it was thought) pay off the creditors in full.  This would 
have meant the loss of an estimated 24,000 jobs, not only in Rover’s 
Longbridge plant near Birmingham (which employed 8,000 workers) but also 
through knock-on effects upon suppliers and dealers and in the wider West 
Midlands economy. 
 
The break-up option, while leaving shareholders and creditors comparatively 
unscathed, would have inflicted substantial losses upon other stakeholder 
groups, in particular employees, long-term customers and suppliers, and the 
local community.  The best outcome for these other stakeholders was clearly the 
emergence of a buyer who would carry on the business as a going concern while 
preserving as many jobs as possible.  As things turned out, employment law 
played a crucial role in achieving this outcome.  
 
Negotiations for the sale of Rover to Alchemy Partners began in secret in 
October 1999, and were only made public in March 2000.  It soon became clear 
that Alchemy intended significantly to reduce the scale of production at Rover’s 
Longbridge plant, by focusing on the small niche market for MG sports cars and 
ceasing production of the main Rover brand.  On this basis, its bid received a 
hostile reception from the trade unions and a frosty one from local authorities in 
the west midlands.  In late March a rival bid, from a group that became known 
as the ‘Phoenix consortium’, was announced.  This was led in due course by 
John Towers, a former chief executive of Rover, and was premised on retaining 
Longbridge as a volume car production facility.   However, for most of April, 
BMW refused to enter into negotiations with Phoenix, and continued instead to 
move towards finalising the sale of Rover to Alchemy. 
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Neither Rover Group nor any of BMW’s other UK subsidiaries had entered into 
consultation with employee representatives over the proposed sale to Alchemy.  
The relevant employee representatives were the recognised unions, who lodged 
claims against Rover before employment tribunals. These were on the basis 
firstly, that the ARD applied and that consultation should therefore have taken 
place about the transfer. Whilst BMW disputed this, the unions nevertheless had 
an arguable case (see Armour and Deakin, 2000, for an account of how this was 
framed). Secondly, it was also argued by the employees that a breach of the 
redundancy consultation laws (the CRD) had occurred, since both BMW and 
Alchemy had indicated that there would be redundancies arising from the sale 
of Rover Group and the other subsidiary companies.  Furthermore, if the ARD 
did apply, then liability under any protective award made against BMW or its 
subsidiaries for failure to comply with the information and consultation 
requirements would have been transmitted to buyers of its businesses. Thirdly, 
steps were taken by lawyers acting for employees to prepare individual claims 
in respect of breach of contract for dismissals carried out in contravention of ‘no 
compulsory redundancy’ agreements entered into between Rover and the unions 
which, it was claimed, had been incorporated into employees’ contracts of 
employment.  Altogether, the potential value of these claims exceeded £300 
million. 
 
It was against this background that Alchemy withdrew from negotiations with 
BMW on 27 April, just before the deadline set for finalising the deal.  The 
catalyst for this turn of events was BMW’s insistence that Alchemy should offer 
it an indemnity against potential claims for (among other things) breach of the 
information and consultation laws, and contractual claims for wrongful 
dismissal.  Press reports at the time indicated that Alchemy had been ready to 
pay £50 million for the company, with BMW meeting certain liabilities arising 
from restructuring, but that it was not prepared to agree to an indemnity 
extending to ‘hundreds and hundreds of millions of pounds’ (see Armour and 
Deakin, 2000, for further details).   
 
The sale to the Phoenix consortium was completed on 10 May 2000.  Rover was 
sold for a nominal £10, with BMW putting in £575 million to help meet short-
term running costs. The Phoenix management pressed the unions to agree to a 
waiver of claims arising out of the failure of BMW (through Rover) to begin 
consultation at the time the prospective sale to Alchemy was announced.  
Although the claim was not waived, agreement was reached on its withdrawal 
on the basis that consultation between Phoenix and the unions had begun at an 
earlier date.  The effect was to save £100 million.  In return, Phoenix agreed to 
insert enhanced redundancy terms in the contracts of employment of 
Longbridge employees.  A further £200 million was saved by Phoenix’s 
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decision to dismiss fewer than 1,000 workers at Longbridge, thereby avoiding 
large-scale redundancy compensation claims. Without formally waiving their 
claims, the employees and their representatives had found themselves in a 
position where their involvement in the rescue process had led to the success of 
the one bid which was consistent with maintaining Rover as a volume car 
producer.   
 
The Rover case is evidence that factoring employee interests into the 
restructuring process can result in outcomes that protect the firm-specific human 
capital of the workforce without undermining the preservation of jobs.  Indeed, 
the role of the law in the Rover case was more positive than that – by requiring 
a potential purchaser to bear the costs of large-scale redundancies, it served to 
penalise a bid which would have broken up the company, leaving Rover a 
shadow of its former self.  Clearly, the law did not operate here in isolation; 
Rover was a strongly unionized company and local communities were active in 
their support.  But without the intervention of the law it is doubtful that these 
factors, alone, would have saved the company.  Government support for the 
rescue option, while largely expressed behind the scenes, may also have been an 
important factor in the company’s survival.  To that extent, Rover may be a one-
off.  But the company’s survival perhaps has wider lessons.  It continues to 
operate today, using a corporate structure in which the share capital is split 
between an employee trust (35%), suppliers (25%) and senior managers (40%) 
(Brady and Lorenz, 2001).  Thus the rescue of the company has given rise to a 
significant experiment in share ownership by stakeholders. 
 
The Rover case is a reminder that mechanisms exist within UK corporate 
governance for the representation and articulation of the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies.  These clearly do not occupy the central place in 
management practice and corporate culture that the values associated with 
shareholder primacy do.  But they nevertheless articulate one of the key tenets 
of the stakeholder argument, namely that managers need to engage the 
voluntary cooperation of non-shareholder constituencies if they are to build 
competitive success, particularly over the longer term.  There are signs that this 
view is increasingly influencing the attitudes of institutional shareholders 
towards the strategies of the companies in which they invest.  As the next 
section shows, this development has the potential to take the stakeholder 
argument from the periphery back into the core of corporate governance 
processes. 
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4.  The changing role of institutional shareholders 
 
Some institutional investors are beginning to use their influence to monitor 
performance by companies across a range of social and environmental issues 
which impact upon stakeholders.  This is being done not solely or even 
predominantly from philanthropical or ethical motives, but through a perception 
that companies which disregard stakeholder concerns are also putting 
shareholder interests at risk.  In this context, the increasing concentration of 
share ownership in institutional hands is significant, since it has the potential to 
reduce the costs of shareholder activism.  As of early 1999, over 70% of listed 
UK equities were held by institutional investors, and this figure has grown 
steadily since the late 1940s (Stapledon, 1999).  In principle, concentration 
should help to overcome free-rider effects among dispersed shareholders, and 
thereby enable shareholders to bring direct pressure to bear on managers.  The 
proliferation of corporate governance codes in the 1990s is, from one 
perspective, evidence of this.  The Cadbury and Greenbury Reports, from which 
the Combined Code evolved, responded to the concerns of institutional 
investors and many of their principles mirrored those found in their trade 
associations’ statements of best practice (Stapledon, 1999: 69-76). This type of 
political activity has clear economies of scale, and so the standard free-rider 
problems do not apply (Davies, 1991: 87; Stapledon, 1996: 59). More 
problematic, however, is the manner of intervention by institutions in individual 
firms.   
 
Governance activity on the part of UK institutional shareholders at firm level 
occurs in three main ways (Stapledon, 1996; Davies, 2000; Crespi-Cladera and 
Renneboog, 2000; Pye, 2001): firstly, through the exercise of voting rights at 
general meetings; secondly, through ongoing dialogue, meetings, information 
transfer and informal discussion with managers; and thirdly, through the 
attachment of conditions to further injections of funds (‘pre-emption’ rights give 
investors significant leverage where poor performance means further finance is 
sought: Paul, 1991).   However, the type of insider control which characterizes 
the continental European systems, where dominant shareholders call managers 
directly to account is still very much the exception.   
 
Concentration at market level may however shape incentives in other ways.  
Hawley and Williams (2000, 2003) argue that the institutionalization of share 
ownership which has occurred in the USA and UK since the 1940s has created a 
new category of ‘universal owners’ with strong incentives to become actively 
involved in the affairs of individual companies.  This is because pension funds, 
in particular, tend to have holdings in a broad cross section of the listed 
company sector.  As a consequence of the growth of the listed company sector 
 18
following, in the case of the UK, the privatization of state-owned industries, this 
increasingly means that they have interests in the economy as a whole.  As a 
result, these shareholders do not benefit from short-term gains achieved through 
the operation of the market for corporate control.  They are likely to take the 
view that takeover bids which result in substantial gains for target shareholders 
bring them little gain if, over time, they do not produce enhanced returns for 
shareholders in bidder companies, since they will most likely hold equity stakes 
in both sets of firms.   
 
Universal owners are also likely to have an extended time horizon for assessing 
corporate performance.  The more they are required by prudential investment 
standards to diversify their holdings across the market as a whole, the more they 
become locked in both to the market and to the individual firms in which they 
hold stakes.  Being subject to lock-in makes them more likely to engage with 
management on a long-term basis to improve performance, and less likely to 
respond to managerial failure by selling their stakes in the companies 
concerned.   
 
In addition, universal ownership provides pension funds with incentives to 
monitor the degree to which firms produce externalities in terms of social and 
environmental costs which fall on third parties or the wider community.  The 
logic of universal ownership is that shareholders will, in the final analysis, bear 
the costs of externalities which cannot easily be absorbed by third parties or 
which produce dislocative effects upon society or the economy.   
 
Trade unions are in a particularly sensitive position with regard to the logic of 
universal ownership.  On the one hand, as representatives of employees, they 
have an interest in supporting corporate strategies which promote job stability 
and high quality employment.  On the other hand, as representatives of pension 
fund beneficiaries, they have both an interest and, under certain circumstances, 
a legal duty, to obtain the highest possible investment returns for their members.  
There is plainly potential for conflict between these two sets of interests.  The 
contradiction disappears if those companies that offer high quality employment 
are seen to be those that also best protect the long-term interests of shareholders.  
Where this is so, unions are able to pursue a dual strategy: in the sphere of 
production, engaging with management through partnership agreements and 
similar arrangements designed to enhance and sustain corporate performance 
while, in the sphere of finance, exercising their influence as shareholders to 
promote progressive human resource management practices.  In practice, 
however, the matter is much more complex than this simple model allows.  A 
crucial variable affecting union involvement in corporate governance processes 
is the ownership structure of pension funds and other collective forms of saving.  
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In the United States, unions jointly control, along with employers, occupational 
pension funds set up under the Taft-Hartley Act 1947, which account for a 
significant proportion of total equity investments, and they have a considerable 
say over the management of many of the large public-sector funds which have 
taken a lead in shareholder activism over the past decade.  US unions have also 
developed a number of strategic alliances with corporate governance activist 
groups, aimed at using shareholder resolutions and the exercise of voting rights 
to bring influence to bear on management (Ghilarducci, Hawley and Williams, 
1997).  Notwithstanding a growing number of TUC initiatives in this area 
(Barber, 2002), UK unions generally have less influence over the management 
of occupational pension funds than their US counterparts do since most UK 
funds are ultimately controlled by employer-nominated trustees.  Union 
involvement in the framing of shareholder resolutions and the conduct of 
campaigns over corporate governance issues is also at a comparatively early 
stage of development by comparison to the USA. 
 
So far, in the UK, evidence for the existence of the universal owner model is 
largely to be found in the emergence of a number of new-style activist funds 
which engage with companies over issues of corporate performance and social 
responsibility  (McLaren, 2002).  A leading example  of a focus fund which 
aims to improve corporate performance through direct engagement is that run 
by Hermes Investment Management Ltd.  Hermes is one of the largest pension 
fund managers in Britain, controlling on behalf of its clients approximately 
1.2% of all the shares on the FTSE All Share Index. It is one of the few large 
pension fund managers that is not owned by a bank or large financial institution; 
rather, it is owned by, and is the principal fund manager for, the British 
Telecom pension fund, the UK’s largest. It also manages pension scheme 
portfolios for a number of other major corporate and public employers. This 
independence is said to allow Hermes to avoid a range of potential conflicts of 
interest which affect investment funds which are part of wider banking groups.  
Hermes is the first major investment institution in the world to have established 
an activist fund which invests in companies that are poorly performing but 
fundamentally sound, with the aim of improving performance and delivering 
long-term shareholder value through better management and corporate 
governance. In this process, a team of specialist professionals liaise closely with 
fund managers to monitor company direction and performance. 
 
Whereas UK institutional investors typically do not become directly involved in 
the management of the companies in which they invest, Hermes’ focus fund is 
set up on the stated belief that companies with concerned and involved 
shareholders are more likely to achieve superior long-term returns than those 
without. Hermes publicly supports a framework for corporate governance in 
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which directors of public companies and shareholders as owners together work 
to maximize long-term shareholder value: ‘companies should manage 
effectively relationships with their employees, suppliers and customers and with 
others who have a legitimate interest in the company’s activities’ (Hermes, 
2002: Principle 9).  Ethical as well as environmentally and socially responsible 
behaviour are also given high priority.   
 
While Hermes is undoubtedly an exceptional case, its approach carries wider 
significance because of the way in which the regulatory framework is currently 
being realigned in an effort to encourage institutional investors to place greater 
weight on voice and less on exit in their relations with companies.  In this 
context, it has been argued that institutional shareholders’ right to vote on 
company resolutions is a fiduciary asset, held for the benefit of fund 
beneficiaries (Monks and Sykes, 2002). If this were so, voting would in effect 
become mandatory.  This is not yet the case in either the UK or the US.  
However, a milder form of the ‘fiduciary asset’ hypothesis would involve 
requiring funds to publicise and in some circumstances justify their voting 
record.  In 2001 amendments to regulations governing occupational pensions 
schemes came into force, which require schemes either to indicate, as part of 
their investment statement, what their position is on a range of matters including 
the social and environmental performance of the companies they invest in or, in 
the absence of such a statement, to justify this stance.10  In this way, the logic of 
comply or explain was extended to the investment community.  The Myners 
report on institutional investment practices, published under the auspices of HM 
Treasury in 2001, issued a set of recommendations that would extend this 
approach further (Myners, 2001).   
 
There are however several problems with the hypothesis that shareholder 
activism could bring about a closer alignment of company practice with 
stakeholder interests.  Firstly, to the degree that investment practices become 
increasingly international, with both UK pension funds increasingly investing 
overseas and foreign funds investing in the UK, it is not obvious that 
institutional investors are necessarily locked into the fate of the UK (or any 
other) economy in the way suggested by the universal owner hypothesis 
(Davies, 1991).  Secondly, it is far from clear that boards and managers will 
necessarily see stakeholder-friendly policies as in the best long-term interests of 
their companies.  As the case studies carried out by Deakin et al. (2002) show, it 
is open to companies to take a low-human capital intensity route to competitive 
success, in particular in product markets with a lower quality segment.  It is 
difficult to see how the logic of comply or explain would have much impact on 
this approach.  Thirdly, accounting conventions for many aspects of social and 
environmental performance do not yet exist, or at least not in the form that they 
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do for financial performance. Capital markets can only act on the information 
available to them; at present, the mechanisms are not in place for producing 
information of the kind which is needed to factor stakeholder-related issues into 
a company’s share price.  As long as this situation persists, there is a need for 
regulation to counteract the distortions that could arise from capital market 
myopia on these issues.   
 
But while the difficulties facing shareholder activism are considerable, they are 
not necessarily insurmountable.  One way forward is to assist the creation of a 
market in information on how firms manage the creation of stakeholder value.  
The Company Law Review’s recommendation for greater disclosure by 
companies of information relating to issues of social and environmental 
responsibility, through the proposed operating and financial review (Company 
Law Review, 2000: 180-193; 2001: 49-54), is of critical importance in this 
regard. As we have seen, this proposal directly addresses the need for 
shareholders and other stakeholders to make better-informed judgments on 
non-financial aspects of corporate performance.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In Britain and America, the rise of hostile takeovers and associated changes to 
corporate governance norms in the 1980s and 1990s revised expectations of the 
role and responsibilities of corporate management, emphasising accountability 
to shareholders above all else.  In the 1990s, proponents of stakeholder voice 
pointed out that the very mechanisms which bind managers to shareholder value 
might harm not only other stakeholders but also shareholders’ interests: by 
impeding firms’ ability to make credible commitments not to expropriate 
stakeholders, these mechanisms created an environment in which firms were 
less able to establish an effective basis for long-term productive relations.  
However, this critique has had little impact on the core institutions of UK 
corporate governance, namely the Takeover Code, the law relating to directors’ 
duties, and the corporate governance codes.   
 
By looking beyond the core, however, we can see that the concerns raised by 
the stakeholder debate of the 1990s have not gone away.  The success over time 
of productive systems still requires significant, long-term investments to be 
made, and cooperative, trust-based alliances to be fostered, between various 
stakeholders.  Non-shareholder constituencies who are asked to make firm-
specific investments in return for an implicit promise of a share of the quasi-
rents generated by their investment and participation will still want protection 
against ex post expropriation by other groups, such as shareholders. 
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Participation or recognition in corporate governance mechanisms may be one 
important way of affording such protection. So corporate governance remains 
for many firms an exercise in setting the conditions for voluntary cooperation 
between stakeholder groups with divergent interests. The argument over the 
optimal form of corporate governance rules has not been concluded; there is a 
genuine choice to be made between mechanisms that place greater or lesser 
emphasis upon stakeholder involvement in governance processes.  On this basis, 
a major countervailing force to shareholder primacy is provided by the 
information and consultation provisions of European Community Directives, 
which are increasingly reshaping UK employment law.  By incorporating 
employee voice into the procedures governing large-scale restructurings, these 
laws alter the balance of financial advantage in commercial transactions in 
favour of stakeholder-orientated strategies.   
 
Over the longer term we should not be surprised to see a clearer articulation 
within UK corporate governance of the importance for companies of creating 
long-term stakeholder value.  This does not mean that the UK will converge 
upon a set of stakeholder-orientated norms of the kind observed in mainland 
Europe and Japan.  In the short run, as the system continues to be skewed 
towards shareholder interests, we may expect considerable turbulence and 
instability in the system of corporate governance as the various actors try to 
make the existing model work.  Managers committed to a strategy of investing 
in stakeholder relations will try, often in conjunction with unions, to convince 
shareholders that this approach is also in their long-term interests.  
Shareholders, in turn, may be prepared to accept this logic.  By these means, 
shareholder primacy could be transformed into a mechanism favouring a 
stakeholder-orientated approach.  But there is nothing inevitable about this 
outcome and it remains the exception, not the rule, in current practice.   
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Notes 
 
1    Council Directive of 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or 
parts of undertakings or businesses, OJ L 082, 22.3.2001, pp. 16-20.  This 
version of the Directive codifies the original measure (Council Directive 
77/187/EC, OJ L 61, 5.3.1977, p. 26) together with amendments made in 
1998 (Council Directive 98/50/EC, OJ L 201, 17.7.1998, p. 88). 
 
2  Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies OJ L 225, 
12.08.1998, pp. 16-21, Arts. 1, 2.  This Directive codifies earlier measures 
(Directive 75/129/EEC, OJ L 48, 22.2.1975, p. 29, and Directive 
92/56/EEC,  (OJ L 245, 26.8.1992, p. 3). 
 
3   Cases C-382/92 and C-383/92 Commission v. United Kingdom [1994] 
IRLR 392, 412. 
 
4   Under the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s. 
188, the period over which consultation must take place is 90 days before 
the first dismissal takes effect if the employer proposes to dismiss 100 or 
more employees at one establishment, and 30 days before the first 
dismissal takes effect if it is proposed to dismiss between 20 and 99 
employees at one establishment.  See Deakin and Morris, 2001: ch. 9.3.1 
for an account of the law.   
 
5   The relevant law for present purposes is contained in Trade Union and 
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, ss. 188-188A, and in the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE) 
1981, regs. 10-11A.  See Deakin and Morris, 2001: ch. 9.3.1. 
 
6    Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of 
a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale 
undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the 
purposes of informing and consulting employees, OJ L 254, 30.9.1994, pp. 
64-72.  A later Directive formally extended the measure to cover the UK 
(which was initially exempt from it) and this was incorporated into UK law 
by SI 1999/3323.  See Deakin and Morris, 2001: 827-934 for an account of 
the relevant law.  Two more recent Directives which will extend the 
information and consultation model are the Framework Directive 2002/14 
on national-level information and consultation of employee representatives 
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and Directive 2001/86 on employee consultation in the European Company 
or Societas Europea: see Barnard and Deakin, 2002. 
 
7  The protective award which is available under UK law for failure to 
consult will double (up to a statutory limit) the salaries and wages of the 
workforce for a period of weeks or months over which consultation should 
have taken place: TULRCA 1992, s. 189.  
 
8  As under the automatic stay of US bankruptcy law (11 USC § 362). A 
similar effect is had upon the claims of unsecured creditors by the 
commencement of winding-up proceedings in the UK (Insolvency Act 
1986, ss. 128, 130(2), 183, 184), or on those of all creditors by the bringing 
of a successful petition for administration (ibid ss 10, 11). 
 
9   This is subject to changes introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 which 
under certain circumstances will reduce the ability of the single secured 
creditor to intervene under the administrative receivership procedure.  
 
10   The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment and Assignment, 
Forfeiture, Bankruptcy, etc.) Amendment Regulations, SI 1999/1849, reg. 
2(4), amending SI 1996/3127. 
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